Tax-benefits reforms and the labor market: evidence from Belgium and other EU countries by Kristian Orsini
Tax-Bene¯ts Reforms and the Labor Market:
Evidence from Belgium and other EU Countries¤
Kristian Orsini (KU Leuven)
Working Paper
This Draft: March 22, 2006
Abstract
During the last decade, several EU countries have tried to tackle unemployment and low activity rates
through extensive tax cuts. In an e®ort to encourage the taking up of work - especially amongst the
less productive workers - policymakers have shown increasing interest in targeted tax and social security
contribution rebates as well as in bene¯ts conditional on being in employment. This paper surveys recent
tax-bene¯t reforms in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, The UK, France and Belgium, focussing in particular
on the reforms carried out in the latter. The potential labor supply e®ect of the Belgian reforms are assessed
via a discrete hours labor supply model. The results are then compared to similar evaluations of reforms
implemented in the aforementioned countries. Results suggest that: (i) generalized tax cut are not always
e®ective in stimulating labor supply; (ii) in several central continental Europe, social security contributions
play a major role in determining the incentives to take up work; (iii) joint assessment of income for both
purposes of taxation and bene¯t eligibility has unambiguous negative e®ects on the labor supply of secondary
earners (i.e. mostly women); (iv) targeted reductions in taxes and social security contributions, as well as
bene¯ts conditioned on employment are e®ective means to promote employment, but (v) e±cient design
of these policies is of greatest importance in order to counter potential negative incentive e®ects on the
population already in employment.
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Recent cross-country empirical studies on the potential negative e®ects of the tax burden on em-
ployment have been surveyed by De Haan, Sturm, and Volkerink (2003). They conclude that,
although the overall e®ect of the tax wedge is probably smaller than earlier estimates, its ef-
fects are greater in continental European countries, due to an intermediate level of labor market
centralization.
Particularly harmful are the e®ects of heavy taxation on the employment level of low skilled
workers (Layard and Nickell, 1999). This holds also for Belgium, where the low skilled employment
rate lies just above 55%. In the case of women, and even more so women in couples, the picture
is particularly dramatic. According to Labor Force Statistics slightly less than 40% of married
women with less than secondary education are in employment.
Employment policy in Continental Europe and in Belgium has traditionally been focused on
demand side measures, probably due to the heavy process of industrial restructuring. In recent
years, however, several EU countries have tried to tackle the inactivity trap from a labor supply
perspective. Starting from 1999 the Belgian federal government has taken major steps towards
the reduction of the tax burden on labor. The ¯rst measure was the introduction of substantial
reductions in employees' Social Security Contributions (SSC) for low paid workers. In a second step
the government has passed a bill for the progressive abolition of the Contribution Compl¶ ementaire
de Crise (CCC), an additional surcharge that had been introduced during the tough budgetary
crisis of the early 90s.
In 2001 the Belgian parliament passed a bill to reform of the personal income tax,1 which
included a refundable tax credit on low earnings and a generalized reduction of the tax burden.
The reform was estimated to have a budgetary cost of 3.33 billion EUR, which corresponded to a
decrease in tax revenue of almost 10%.
In year 2004, a year before full implementation of the tax reform, a second reform amended
some aspects of the tax regime. In particular, the newly introduced tax credit on low earnings was
replaced by a substantial decrease in low skilled employees' SSC.
This paper describes the recent Belgian reforms and evaluates their potential impact on labor
supply. At the same time it compares the Belgian experience to those of several other EU countries
(namely the UK, Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands) that have recently introduced (or
planned) signi¯cant reforms in their tax-bene¯t systems.
Consistently with evaluations of the reforms in the above countries, we develop a discrete-hours
labor supply model. Such models assume that there are no feedback e®ects due to the interaction
of labor supply and demand and neglect the potential e®ects of involuntary unemployment.2
1 De CallataÄ y (2002) argues that the term `tax reform' is partially misleading given the substantial continuity of
the new tax code with the previous one, and prefers the term `tax reduction'.
2 Neglecting the latter may indeed lead to severe bias in the estimate of labor supply elasticities, while aggregated
behavioral e®ects tend to be overestimated Bargain, Caliendo, Haan, and Orsini (2005). It might be argued, however,
that neglecting involuntary unemployment as well as potential feedback e®ects leads to upper bound estimates of
the behavioral adjustments. Note that one of the surveyed papers (Aaberge, Colombino, and Str¿m, 2004) controls
for involuntary unemployment.
1The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 will summarize recent reforms in the EU
countries, section 3 will introduce the recent reforms implemented in Belgium, section 4 presents the
methodological framework; section 5 overviews empirical ¯ndings related to reforms in Germany,
in the Netherlands, in Italy, in the UK and in France; section 6 analyzes the potential impact of
the Belgian reforms and section 7 concludes.
2 Tax-bene¯t reforms in the EU
The withdrawal of means-tested social assistance bene¯ts or unemployment bene¯ts, coupled with
heavy taxation of earned income and ¯xed costs of labor supply, signi¯cantly reduces the incentives
to take up paid work, generating, especially for the less productive workers, inactivity and poverty
traps.3
The situation is particularly dramatic in continental Europe which heavily depends on a high
wage strategy. The Bismarkian welfare state is in fact characterized by relatively high social
security contribution and generous insurance based transfers, while labor markets are relatively
sticky given the rigidly structured industrial relations.
The fact that labor market performance of less skilled workers has been particularly poor in
these countries is con¯rmed by a recent study of Daveri and Tabellini (2000). The authors argue
that the heavy burden in terms of labor costs, combined with an intermediate degree of labor
market centralization is the main cause of persisting poor employment performances.
Reforms introduced in EU Member States in the past 10 years have aimed at stimulating
employment by reforming their tax and bene¯t systems.4
The reforms have followed two major axes: on the one side, they have aimed at a generalized
reduction of the tax burden (especially on labor), and on the other they have introduced more
or less generous schemes aiming at increasing the income of the working poor. `In-work' tax
credits, subsidized social security contributions and employment conditional transfers all fall into
the second group of measures, generally referred to as Making Work Pay (MWP) policies.5
In the US, where such instruments were ¯rst introduced, the transfers were assigned via a tax
credit on earned income. In the UK, the transfer was originally a means tested bene¯t for which
poor working households could apply. A peculiarity of most Continental European countries is the
contribution ¯nanced and insurance based social security. Contribution rates tend to be extremely
high even on very low earnings. Next to refundable tax credits and employment conditional
3 For a detailed discussion of inactivity and poverty traps at the European level, see P¶ erivier (2003).
4 We here review only the main reforms implemented (or planned) in the most recent years. Radical reforms were
introduced earlier in the 90s in Scandinavian countries, while minor reforms were implemented in Austria and Spain.
For a detailed review of these reforms, see Sterdyniak (2003) and Bernardi and Profeta (2004).
5 MWP policies have been proposed as hybrid instruments designed to reshape the link between employment,
solidarity and social justice in the new century's welfare state. Given their hybrid nature, it should not come as
a surprise that at least two broad motivations may be put forward to justify their implementation (Pearson and
Scarpetta, 2000): (i) economic inclusion, i.e. the economic mainstreaming of society's most vulnerable individuals,
with positive feedbacks coming from decreased spending on income maintenance and poverty related social problems
like poor health or crime; (ii) redistribution, i.e. increasing the ¯nancial resources of the weakest fraction of the
population, with positive feedbacks coming from increased social cohesion.
2bene¯ts, some EU countries have therefore introduced rebates on social security contributions.
In the following sections we will review the recent reforms in the EU countries. We then
introduce with some detail the Belgian tax reform (2001) and the successive rebate on low skilled
SSCs (2004). Finally we compare these measures from the point of view of their budgetary cost.
2.1 Germany
As part of the Agenda 2010 - a comprehensive package of measures to re-launch the German
economy - in 2001 the German parliament adopted a major reform of the income tax system.
In 2003, the Minijob reform signi¯cantly extended the social security subsidies on low earnings.
The Minijob reform was only a small part of the so called Hartz-IV program which also included
extended cuts in unemployment bene¯ts and in income assistance (Wunsch, 2003). In this review,
however, we will only focus on the tax and on the Minijob reforms: two measures that have been
extensively discussed in the recent German economic literature.
The tax reform raised the basic personal allowance and signi¯cantly lowered tax rates. By
2005, year of the full implementation of the tax reform, the tax rate in the ¯rst tax bracket fell to
15% (from 22.9% in 2000) while the top rate was cut to 42% (from 51% in 2000).6 The e®ects of a
tax and bene¯t reform may be best summarized by the changes in households' budget constraints.
This is done in ¯gures 1 and 2 for a single earner and a two earner household respectively. The
budget sets were drawn using the EU-15 Tax bene¯t model EUROMOD, assuming an hourly wage
of 6.6 EUR, which corresponds to 2001 Belgium minimum wage (the French minimum wage for
the same year is slightly below this threshold). As it shows in ¯gures 1 and 2, the tax reform
had a limited e®ects on low paid workers. In particular, in the case of single earner households
personal income tax plays a marginal role only, while social security contributions are much more
important. Reducing the income tax alone does not have an incentive e®ect in this household
typology, at least when working up to 50 hours per week. The incentive e®ect is slightly stronger
in two earners households, given that income taxation is joint in Germany.
In an e®ort to more e±ciently target low skilled workers, several proposals have been made
to subsidize social contribution payments.7 In 2003 the Parliament ¯nally adopted the Minijob
reform. Under the new system earnings up to 400 EUR are exempted from SSCs, and are not
liable to the (joint) income tax (the limit was at 325 EUR, before the reform). Once earnings are
above this threshold, the part exceeding the threshold is liable to social security payments. Income
taxation - however - applies on total income (and not just on the part exceeding the threshold):
this explains the drop of disposable income once the 400 EUR threshold is passed. The subsidy,
moreover, is not linked to working time and it therefore entails a premium for working shorter hours
(especially for medium wage earners). This is partially visible in ¯gure 2: the new exemption from
social security contribution shifts the small peak in the budget constraint from more or less 12 to
16 hours per week. The peak comes at lower working hours for persons with slightly higher wage.
6 For more details see Bundes¯nanzministerium (2003).
7 The debate mainly concerned the level of the °oor on social security contribution, and whether this threshold
had to be de¯ned at the household or at the individual level (Bonin, Kempe, and Schneider, 2002).
3In ¯gure 1 the e®ect of the reform is not visible. With one adult working part-time at the
minimum wage, the household is still in the bene¯t range, so every increase in the net income will
be o®set by a reduction in the social assistance. This points at another result: in presence of very
generous social assistance, any e®ort to modify incentives by decreasing taxation or social security
contributions for the low skilled will be o®set by the 100% e®ective tax rate implicitly built up in
most social assistance schemes.
2.2 The Netherlands
In 2001, an important tax reform was introduced in The Netherlands. The new tax system
explicitly recognizes the di®erence between more and less mobile productive factors: income from
labor, pensions and imputed rents from owner occupied dwellings are globally taxed under one
taxing regime. Income from capital on the other hand is imputed from total wealth.8
At the same time the reform signi¯cantly decreased the tax burden on labor income: new
minimum and maximum marginal tax rates are now 33 and 52% (prior to the 2001 reform the
highest marginal tax rate was at 60%).9 The lower level of taxation is clearly shown in the budget
set of two earner households (see ¯gures 2).
A feature that was particularly discouraging to female employment was the existence of a
transferable personal tax deduction. If one of the partners did not work (or worked only in a
marginal part-time), the credit could be almost fully transferred to the other partner. Given that
females are more often the secondary earner in a couple, the measure represented a signi¯cant
disincentive for women to work more than part-time.10
Moreover the former tax allowance on earned income was replaced by a new employment tax
credit: the `arbeidskorting'. The maximum amount of the tax credit is EUR 920, which is reached,
with a progressive phase-in, at EUR 15,117, i.e. the full-year equivalent of a full-time at minimum
wage. The Dutch tax credit is not phased-out and it is not refundable. Like the German Minijob, he
tax credit is not conditional on any working time requirement. This implies that a person working
half time at an hourly wage twice the minimum rate, bene¯ts from the same tax reduction as a
person working full time at minimum wage. Figure 1 clearly shows the e®ect of the credit. After
the reform, disposable income is highest when working full time. Moreover the tax advantage does
not decrease (in absolute value) when working hours increase. It should be noted, however, that
for higher than minimum wage earners, the bump in the budget set will be met when working less
than full time.
8 Income from wealth is imputed assuming a return rate of 4%, irrespective of the composition of the portfolio.
Imputed incomes are then taxed at a °at rate of 30%.
9 For more details see Ministerie van FinanciÄ en (2001).
10 According to Van Soest and Das (2000), this partially explains the widespread popularity of very short working
hours in the Netherlands.
42.3 Italy
The reform of the tax system proposed by the Italian government arguably represents the most
neo-liberal reform in continental Europe. The reform of the tax system was one of the major
pre-electoral engagements of the center-right coalition. However, the business cycle dynamics and
the considerable deterioration of public ¯nance in the ¯rst years of the mandate have pushed part
of the coalition to block the reform. According to the government, however, the tax reform has
only been postponed to the next mandate.
Relying on the text of the framework law and the parliamentary text to introduce the bill,
Baldini and Bosi (2002) describe the most likely features of the reform and estimate its distribu-
tional impact. The plan was inspired by the Flat Rate Tax (FRT) model, yet it was di®erent from
the most basic model on several aspects. The existing tax schedules had to collapse into two tax
brackets: the marginal tax rate would have been at 23% between 0 and 100,000 EUR and at 33%
thereafter.11
To avoid imposing a heavy tax burden on very small incomes and to partially preserve the
progressiveness of the tax system, a series of (non-refundable) tax credits were supposed to come
along with the °at tax reform. The tax credit, or No-Tax-Area (NTA) were designed to vary in
accordance with personal labor market status (i.e. inactive, employee or self-employed) and family
conditions (number of dependents), but there is much uncertainty about their level.12
In ¯gures 1 and 2 the NTAs are not simulated, while the °at tax rate is at 23.3%. The ¯gures
do not refer to the actually planned tax reform, but to an extremely similar FTR reform analyzed
by Aaberge, Colombino, and Str¿m (2004).
In the case of a FTR reform low wage earners are worse o®, while high wage earners witness a
decrease in their tax liability. For low wage earners, the new budget curve lies under the pre-reform
budget curve. When working close to 80 hours per week, however, the post reform budget curve
cuts the pre reform curve.
2.4 UK
In the late 90s, the Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC) replaced the Family Credit (FC) which
had been introduced in 1986 as a form of support for low-income working parents. The WFTC
which, relative to the FC, substantially increased the amount of the bene¯t, is conditional on
working at least 16 hours per week, and not 24 as was the rule before 1992. In 2003, the WFTC
was redesigned: social assistance for children (which is added to the universal child bene¯t) was
made means tested and not conditional on the employment status of parents, whereas the in-
11 According to Baldini and Bosi (2002) taxes in the new system will be °at-rate for about 99% of taxpayers.
12 In an early proposal the maximum NTA was supposed to vary from 3,000 EUR for an inactive single to around
11,000 EUR for an employee with dependent partner and one dependent child (3,000 EUR as a basic tax credit plus
4,000 EUR as a tax credit on employment income and 2,000 EUR for each dependent family member). Beyond
the NTA, the tax credit would be tapered away at a rate of probably 40-50%, meaning that no tax credit would
be available for a tax payer with taxable income around 35-40,000 EUR (the ¯gure refers to an employee with two
dependent family members). The NTA is quite similar to the Dutch arbeidskorting, with the main di®erence that
the former is phased out after attaining a certain maximum value.
5work bene¯t was extended to people without children. The WFTC was therefore split into a
Child Tax Credit (CTC) and a Working Tax Credit (WTC), which entails a clearer separation of
anti-child-poverty and Making-Work-Pay measures.
The new WTC is available to both singles and couples with or without children, although
amounts vary according to family situation. Couples and lone parents are entitled to a maximum
refundable credit of $3,025 per year, plus a bonus of $620 per year for those working 30 hours
or more a week. Moreover, families with children in which all adults work, care or are disabled
may receive help to cover costs of approved child care. Families with annual incomes below $5,060
are entitled to the full amount; at income levels above this threshold a taper of 37% reduces
entitlement.
Figures 1 and 2 show the switch from FC to the WFTC. This is not the most recent reform,
but like in the case of Italy, it is of most interest to focus on a reform whose potential labour
supply e®ects have been estimated (Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir, 2000).
2.5 France
Up to 1998, France found itself in a paradoxical situation: an inactive person collecting the Revenu
Minimum d'Insertion (RMI) was receiving more than a worker working half time at minimum
wage.13
In 2000, the French government reformed the housing allowance and introduced an in-work
bene¯t, the Prime Pour l'Emploi. To be eligible, at least one member of the household must
be employed, taxable income (jointly assessed at household level) must be lower than a certain
amount (EUR 30,050 for a couple with two children) and individual earnings must be between
EUR 3,265 and EUR 23,207 per year. The level of the subsidy was originally 2.2% of net earnings,
which for a minimum wage worker correspond to about 300 EUR per year. The original plan of the
Jospin government was to increase the bene¯t to 4.4% and to 6.6% of net earnings in two steps.
An interesting feature of the PPE - at least in its original version - is that it is strictly connected
to hours worked: earnings are in fact recomputed in full time equivalent, so that only unskilled
workers with low hourly earnings are targeted, clearly distinguishing between low skills and low
e®ort. In 2003, the government increased the bene¯t to 4.4% of net earnings and introduced a
bonus for working part time. A full-time worker may therefore be eligible to a maximum bene¯t
of EUR 443 per year, whereas a part-time worker has the right to a maximum of EUR 322 per
year (i.e. slightly more than half the full-time bene¯t). The French PPE presents some hybrid
features: it is means tested on household income, but at the same time it is individualized in the
sense that it is also conditional on individual earnings and more than one person in the household
may be eligible. Figures 1 and 2 show disposable income before and after introducing the PPE.
The e®ect is smaller than that of the WFTC, but the phasing out is much smoother and, contrary
13 Working full-time at the minimum wage, on the other hand, brought about a ¯nancial gain of about EUR 230
per month. Hardly a signi¯cant incentive to take up work, especially if we consider the ¯xed costs a worker incurs
when taking up a job. Such an inactivity trap was due to the fact that earned income was taken into account in the
income test to compute housing allowance eligibility, whereas the RMI was disregarded (P¶ erivier, 2003).
6to the WFTC, the PPE does not recreate °at segments into the budget line. This is due to the
fact that eligibility to the PPE depends on hourly wage, so that only the low skilled are actually
targeted. The better targeting of the instrument allows for a much more generous phasing out.
Moreover the bene¯t is phased in with working time, so that full time workers are entitled to a
higher premium than part time workers.
3 Reforms in Belgium
In August 2001 the Belgian Parliament implemented the tax reform announced by the federal gov-
ernment in its Policy Plan of 17th October 2000. The reform was phased in progressively between
2001 and 2005. One interesting feature of the reform is that it included both a generalized tax
reduction and the introduction of a refundable earned income tax credit. However, in 2004 the
refundable earned income tax credit was replaced by a rebate on low skilled social security contri-
butions. The latter measure, it was argued, would be more e®ective in promoting the employment
of the low-skilled.
The principal axes of the original reform were:
1. the increase in deductions for working expenses (from 20 to 25% of gross earnings up to 5,329
EUR);
2. the broadening of the central tax brackets (the lowest boundary of the 45% marginal tax
rate bracket was increased, while the upper boundary of the 30% and 40% bracket were
increased);
3. the abolition of the highest marginal tax rates (from 55% and 52,5% to 50%);
4. the alignment of the tax exempt income quotas for couples to the level of that for singles
(from 3,250 EUR to 4,095 EUR);
5. and the introduction of an earned income tax credit - CIBRAP hereafter.14
The CIBRAP was introduced with the explicit aim of making employment ¯nancially more
attractive, especially to youngsters and women, and - at the same time - redistributing income in
an e®ort to reduce the poverty risk of less productive workers (Ministµ ere de Finances, 2002).
The Belgian CIBRAP is quite similar to the Dutch `arbeidskorting': it is fully individualized
and not means-tested on household income, but, similarly to the Anglo-Saxon measures, it is
refundable.15
14 Cr¶ edit d'Imp^ ot pour les Bas Revenus d'Activit¶ e Profesionnelle.
15 Individualization of the bene¯t implies - for example - that both members of a couple are potentially eligible
and more importantly - the income of one partner has no e®ect on the eligibility of the other. The main drawback
of the family based IWBs is therefore avoided. On the other hand, the broad eligibility conditions imply that the
amount of the bene¯t is much lower than the WFTC. Also, di®erently from the WFTC and the PPE, the CIBRAP
is not scaled according to family conditions, so that the number of dependants is not taken into account. Such a
feature may cause the bene¯t to be quite ine®ective in tackling inactivity traps, as means-tested bene¯ts like the
MINIMEX are scaled on household size. The net replacement rate of inactivity by employment will therefore be
higher for single women on social assistance than for single mothers.
7Other characteristics of the tax credit closely match the characteristics of the instruments that
already exist in other countries: the bene¯t is phased in and phased out with a relatively low
taper, it is conditional on working at least 13 hours and it is administered by the ¯scal authorities.
The maximum amount of the credit, however, was limited to just above 500 EUR per year.16
One year before reaching its full level, the CIBRAP was replaced by the employment bonus, BE
hereafter17 - a rebate on low wage employees' SSCs. 18 The term `Bonus' is somewhat misleading,
and has generated some confusion in the public debate. The bonus is a structural reduction on
quarterly SSC paid by low wage employees. The ¯rst reduction had been introduced in 1999.
In 2001 it consisted of 81.8 EUR per month, for full time equivalent gross employment incomes
between 877 and 1,147 EUR.19 The bene¯t was then phased out with a rather sharp taper rate
of 36.5%, to be fully exhausted at 1,367 EUR. Following the introduction of the new bonus, the
base reduction will reach 140 EUR in 2006. The minimum income threshold has been abolished,
while the upper threshold was brought to 1,210 EUR per month. After this level the reduction is
phased out with a taper of 17.8%, to be fully exhausted at an equivalent monthly full time gross
income of 2,000 EUR. In principle, a minimum wage legislation applies in Belgium. In 2001 full
time minimum wage was 1,140 EUR per month. This implies that the bonus should never exceeds
SSC due. In some minor cases (mostly for young apprentices) the minimum wage legislation does
not apply. In this case the bonus may even become refundable.
The appealing feature of the bonus is its link with equivalent full time earnings: gross earnings
are ¯rst transformed in full time equivalent, then the maximum reduction to which a worker
might be entitled is scaled to the amount of hours worked. This way, employees working full time
are entitled to the full reduction, while part time employees will only have half of the maximum
reduction. This feature is indeed an improvement with respect to the previous CIBRAP given that
the latter did not distinguish between low productivity and low e®ort. Moreover, low wage workers
bene¯t from the SSCs deductions immediately (instead of having to anticipate the following year's
tax reimbursement).20
Figures 1 and 2 show disposable income before the originally planned reform and the current
reform (hereafter respectively reform I and reform II). Several aspects are particularly interesting:
in the case of single earner households neither reform modi¯es the incentives to take up work
up to 34 hours per week. The increase in disposable income is highest when working full time.
16 Eligibility starts when net earned income (i.e. gross earned income net of SSCs and imputed professional
expenses) is above EUR 3,750. Between this lower threshold and EUR 5,000 the bene¯t will be phased in very
sharply at a rate of 40.5% (i.e. the bene¯t increases by EUR 40.5 for every EUR 100 earned between EUR 3,750
and EUR 5,000). Between EUR 5,000 and EUR 12,530 EUR the bene¯t amounts to EUR 506 and between EUR
12,530 and EUR 16,280 the bene¯t is phased out at a rate of 13.5%, meaning that EUR 13.5 of bene¯t are lost for
every additional EUR 100 earned.
17 Bonus µ a l'emploi.
18 Other minor measures (accounting for less than 15% of the total budget) were also included in the reform, but
they will not be examined in the present study since they are not likely to a®ect labor supply. For details on the
other measures, see Ministµ ere de Finances (2002), and an evaluation by Vallenduc (2002).
19 This ¯gures refer to white collar workers. For blue collars workers the maximum amount and the income limits
are slightly higher due to di®erences in the social security regime.
20 The CIBRAP did not disappear completely: it is still in place for self-employed, given that the latter do not
bene¯t from the reductions in social security contributions.
8At minimum wage, moreover, both reforms have a similar e®ect on disposable income. At higher
hourly wages, however, the bump in the budget line corresponding to the CIBRAP, is reached when
working less than full time. The same does not apply under reform II: the reduction increases with
working time and it is always at its highest level when working full time. In the case of double
earner households this e®ect is even clearer: when working less than full time reform I is more
advantageous than reform II, but the reverse applies when working more than full time. Again,
for hourly wages above the minimum level the cutting point between the two budget lines lies
before the 40 hours/week point. Therefore, while both reforms might have a similar impact on
incentives to take up work, the BE does not entail the negative e®ect on working hours which is
clearly present in the CIBRAP (at least for workers earning more than the minimum wage).
4 Tax-bene¯t reforms and labor supply: methodological
framework
The ¯scal reforms that have been implemented in the US and EU countries in the last decades
have fostered a growing literature on the impact of changes in the budget constraints on labor
supply.
A variety of methodological approaches have been used for in-depth analysis of the labor supply
impact of tax reforms. Such studies have been of crucial importance to evaluate policy measures
in terms of costs and bene¯ts and potential distortions on the behavior of di®erent social groups.
Some of these approaches are ex-post and are based on natural experiments or the methodology
of di®erences in di®erences (Blundell, Brewer, and Shephard, 2005). Given the time delay in the
availability of data such analyses are mostly of historical interest.
Ex-ante evaluations however are also possible. The latter rely on a su±ciently large sample of
the targeted population, on a detailed microsimulation model and on an econometrically tractable
choice model.
4.1 Data and microsimulation model
This study relies on the most recent wave of the PSBH, i.e. the 11th wave collected in 2001
and containing information on the incomes of year 2000. Unfortunately this was the last wave
of the survey, so that it will not be possible to assess the reform ex-post using techniques based
on microdata (e.g. di®erence in di®erences). Descriptive statistics of the adult population are
presented in table 1. We focus on the subpopulation of households where both spouses are in
working age and available for the labor market (i.e. not in full time education, not disabled, not
retired and not self-employed).21
Mod¶ et¶ e - the Belgian module of EUROMOD - reproduces for each household the set of net
disposable income corresponding to di®erent combinations of working hours of the male and female
21 Of course self-employed have also a °exible labor supply. However, the information on hours worked and on
gross earnings are often reported with a high degree of approximation (when not missing). The estimates of a labor
supply model for the self employed are therefore highly unreliable.
9partner.
For workers with observed wages, gross income across di®erent labor supply alternatives are
computed assuming a constant hourly wage rate. For inactive and unemployed workers hourly
wages were imputed separately for males and females using regression techniques. For females the
censoring e®ect was more signi¯cant: we therefore used a Heckman correction model. In the case
of males the hypothesis of null correlation between the residuals of the labor supply and the wage
equation could not be rejected, so we used a standard regression model estimated on the sample
of employees.
Estimates of the wage equations are presented in table 2. Coe±cients all have the expected
sign, and the inverse Mill's ratio (lambda) hints at a signi¯cant selection bias for females. In
particular the constant for female wage is somewhat lower than that of males, while the e®ects
of schooling and potential experience have a similar order of magnitude. The prediction error is
given by the RSME, and - as expected - is slightly larger for females than for males. The error are
nevertheless in the order of magnitude of other recent studies (Laroque and Salanie, 2002).
Once household gross incomes corresponding to the di®erent working time alternatives have
been computed, the microsimulation model computes the corresponding set of disposable incomes.
These are reported in the table 3, which also reports other demographic statistics for the subsample
used in the estimation procedure.
4.2 Behavioral model and econometric framework
Traditional approaches, based on the estimation of continuous labor supply functions, have proven
computationally cumbersome even in the simplest case, let alone in the more complex cases in
which multiple welfare programme participation, the social stigma of bene¯t take up and the ¯xed
cost of labor supply are considered. Recently, however, the analysis has been greatly simpli¯ed
by the discrete approach proposed by van Soest (1995). Such models explicitly recognize the
institutional constraints on labor supply which result in a limited set of working time alternatives
(inactivity, several part-time categories, full-time and over-time).22
Most importantly, however, the computational burden of estimating labor supply functions
boils down to ML estimation of a more or less articulated conditional logit function.
Once preference parameters are estimated, optimal behavior conditional to the post reform
budget constraints is used to predict post reform participation and working time decisions.23
Discrete choice models of labor supply are based on the assumption that a household can choose
among a ¯nite number J +1 of working hours (J positive hours and non-participation); each hour
j=0,...,J corresponds to a given level of disposable income Cij (we suppose here that choice j=0 cor-
responds to non-participation) and each discrete bundle of leisure and income provides a di®erent
level of utility. The approach has become standard practice as it provides a straightforward way
22 Although this is mostly the case, the methodology can be applied to a larger number of budget points (Van Soest,
Das, and Gong, 2002)
23 See van Soest (1995), Keane and Mo±t (1998), Hoynes (1996), Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000),
Van Soest and Das (2000), Bonin, Kempe, and Schneider (2002), Bargain (2004a) and Haan and Steiner (2004).
10to account for taxes and bene¯ts, hence nonlinear and nonconvex budget sets, and the joint labor
supply of spouses. In e®ect, choices j=0,...,J in a couple correspond simply to all the combinations
of the spouses' discrete hours. We assume that females may choose between working 0, 20, 40
or 50 hours, while men may work 0, 40 or 50 hours,24 the database contained almost no case of
males in couples working part-time. The interaction of the two choices generates 12 alternative
characterized by triplets of disposable income, leisure of the female spouse and leisure of the male
spouse. It should be noted here that the term leisure should be interpreted as non labor market
time. Household's utility Vij derived by household i from making choice j, corresponds to the sum
of the deterministic part of the utility Uij, which is assumed to depend on a function of spouses'
leisures Lfij, Lmij, disposable income Cij (equivalent to aggregate household consumption in a
static framework) and household characteristics Zi, and of an unobserved random term ²ij:
Vij = U(Hfij;Hmij;Cij;Zi) + ²ij: (2)
When the error term ²ij is assumed to be identically and independently distributed across
alternatives and households according to a EV ¡I distribution, McFadden (1973) proves that the
probability that alternative k is chosen by household i is given by:





The likelihood for a sample of observed choices can be derived from that expression and max-
imized to estimate the parameters of function U. When actual working hours are used, the econo-
metrician assumes that individuals choose freely their working hours and face no demand-side
constraints.
In the following, we assume a quadratic speci¯cation of the utility function as in Blundell,
Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000). Hence, the utility function of a couples household has the
following form:
Uij = ®cCij + ®ccC2
ij + ®hfHfij + ®hhfHf2
ij + ®hmHmij + ®hhmHm2
ij (3)
+®chfCijHfij + ®chmCijHmij + ®hmhfHfijHmij ¡ ¯pt:
We assume that preferences vary across households through taste-shifter (age, number of small
children):
24 Hours worked were censored at 80 hours per week and discretized according to the following rule:
(1)
H = 0;8h 2 [0;10]
H = 20;8h 2 [11;34]
H = 40;8h 2 [35;44]
H = 50;8h 2 [45;80]
11®c = ®c0 + ®c1X1 (4)
®hf = ®lf0 + ®lf1X2
®hm = ®lm0 + ®lm1X3:
We follow van Soest (1995) and introduce a dummy variable for the part time ¯pt. The dummy
variables may capture di®erent aspects not explicitly treated in the model: search costs, rationing
e®ect and dynamic maximization.
Parameter estimates for the behavioral model are shown in table 4. The results are in line with
theoretical predictions and recent empirical ¯ndings. The coe±cients imply marginally decreasing
utility of consumption and leisure. Together with the interaction terms, these coe±cients determine
the elasticity of labor supply. The preference for leisure displays a clear pattern with respect to age
and number of small children. Observed heterogeneity on the other hand does not seem to explain
the preference for income. The derivatives with respect to leisure show that for a signi¯cant share
of the population positive monotonicity in leisure is not respected. As stressed by Euwals and van
Soest (1999), there is no necessity to restrict preferences relative to the taste for leisure. With
respect to income, however, preferences are well behaved, and no restriction had to be imposed in
the estimation.
The quality of the model's predicting power may be best judged by comparing the observed
and predicted frequencies for each alternative. The predicted frequencies, reported in table 5 are
obtained by averaging up, over the whole sample, each household's probability of choosing a given
regime.
In the present non-linear model, labor supply elasticities cannot be derived analytically but it
is still possible to simulate numerically the impact of a marginal increase in gross hourly wages on
hours of work and participation. Instead of the `aggregated frequencies' technique, we follow the
calibration method which is consistent with the probabilistic nature of the model at the individual
level.25 The elasticities presented in table 6 are mean elasticities.
There are no recent studies on labor supply elasticity for Belgium using a similar methodology.
Elasticities appear to be very small and are mostly driven by changes in the participation rate
rather than by changes at the intensive margin.
This ¯nding is in line with the experience of other Continental European countries. Table 7
shows recent labor supply elasticity estimates derived using a similar methodological framework.26
Male labor supply elasticities for Germany tend to be comparable to those of Belgium (just around
25 It simply consists in drawing the random terms of the model from their distributions until a match between
predicted and observed choice is observed for each household. These draws are then used for predicting labor supply
responses to a shock on wages or a tax reform. Following the reform, in fact, the structural part of the utility varies,
while the drawn errors are held constant. Averaging over a large number of draws provide robust transition matrices
(Creedy and Kalb, 2005).
26 The study of Aaberge, Colombino, and Str¿m (2004) is the only one which adopts a slightly di®erent methodology.
The labor supply model is still discrete choice. Rather than assuming a constant wage rate, the authors estimate a
joint distribution of wage and working time. Each individual is then characterized by a distribution of probability
of ¯nding a given job characterized by a couple wage-working time. The model is estimated by selecting out several
point in the time hours distribution.
12.20), while female labor supply elasticities compare well with the French estimate. Male labor
supply elasticities in the Netherlands and in Italy are signi¯cantly lower (from .08 to .10 and .12
respectively). On the other hand female labor supply appears to be more elastic in both countries
(from .52 to .71 and .66 for the Netherlands and Italy respectively).27 Note, however, that these
di®erences are not always statistically signi¯cant. In the case of Belgium, at least, the con¯dence
intervals for male and female elasticities partially overlap.28
5 Evaluations of reforms in the other EU countries
Table 8 summarizes the estimated impact of the reforms surveyed in section 2. These evaluations
are all based on the methodology described in the previous section.29
Haan and Steiner (2004) evaluate the e®ects of the Agenda 2010 tax reform in Germany. The
latter estimate that the reduction of the tax burden on labor is likely to increase total labor supply
by around 1.2% for females and .9% for males. This reform did not target the very low skilled
population. For those with hourly wages in the range of 6-7 EUR, the budget constraint is hardly
modi¯ed. At higher wage rates the incentive system is modi¯ed only when working full time. This
is linked to the fact that for low skilled workers social security contributions tend to be much more
important, while the relative weight of income taxation tend to be marginal.
Steiner and Wrohlich (2005) assess the impact of the Minijob reform. They ¯nd moderate
participation e®ects. Female in couples increase working hours, but this gain is partially o®set
by a reduction in male hours supplied. The result is hardly surprising: the reform increases the
discontinuity in the budget line. In our example (see ¯gure 2), after working around 15 hours at
an hourly wage of 6.6 EUR, household disposable income decreases due to the setting in of joint
taxation. The same level of income is then reached again when working about 20 hours. This
creates an unambiguous incentive to reduce labor supply to the level of the peak. While some new
workers may be pushed to participate in the labor market, some low skilled already in employment
will be pushed to reduce labor supply. Considering the labor supply of singles, the total e®ect on
hours worked is negative.
For the Netherlands, Van Soest and Das (2000) apply the discrete hours setting to estimate
the labor market impact of the tax reform similar to the one actually adopted by parliament
and described above. They conclude that the tax reform will have a signi¯cant impact on female
labor supply: average working hours will increase by over 4%. Part of the increase is driven
by a change in the participation rate (1.48%). The introduction of the `arbeidskorting' clearly
represents an incentive to take up work. However a substantial increase in working hours also
comes from females in employment working in marginal part time position. Indeed prior to the
27 Unfortunately there is no study based on discrete hours modeling which explicitly reports the size of labor supply
elasticities in the UK.
28 The intervals were computed by bootstrapping 100 times from the asymptotic distribution of the parameters
estimates and re-calibrating.
29 Aaberge, Colombino, and Str¿m (2004) use a partially di®erent methodology (see note 26) and Bargain (2004a)
models only the labor supply of females in couples, assuming a male chauvinist labor supply model, where males
have a ¯xed labor supply.
13reform, secondary earners could transfer part of the tax credit to the primary earners, so that
several households found it convenient that secondary earners would supply hours until the point
where a further increase in working time would reduce the transferable part of the tax credit.
Van Soest and Das (2000) however, do not decompose the e®ect of the reform, so that it is not
possible to identify the contribution of each measure.
In the case of Italy, the impact of a revenue-neutral FRT tax reform on labor supply was
estimated by Aaberge, Colombino, and Str¿m (2004), almost 4 years before such a proposal begun
to be discussed. The revenue neutral reform analyzed in the paper implied an equivalent tax rate
of 23.3% - based on the 1992 tax bene¯t legislation. The microsimulation results suggest that
participation is likely to decrease (-1.8 percentage points for females), but the total amount of
hours is likely to increase (+5.8% and +1.17% for females and males respectively). The latter
result is due to the fact that average tax rates for households with lowest earning capacity increase
pushing their members out of the labor market. For most other households, however, there is an
incentive to supply more hours of work, given the decrease of the marginal tax rate.
Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, and Meghir (2000) develop a full structural model of discrete-hours
labor supply and estimate the impact of the transition from the FC to the WFTC both on couples
and on single females. They ¯nd evidence of an increase in labor market participation of lone
parents (+2.2 percentage points) and to a lesser extent of men, although it is partially o®set by a
reduction in the hours supplied by men already in the labor market. The labor supply reduction of
female secondary earners is however signi¯cant (hours worked decrease by +0.18%). This is hardly
surprising given the important °attening of the budget line. Indeed in single earner households, the
hours requirement and the premium clearly increase incentives to move into employment, but the
household level targeting implies that households with secondary earners (i.e. females in couples)
su®er much less from a reduction of hours worked. The small ¯nancial loss could then be more than
outweighed by an increase in non market time. The predicted net e®ect of the WFTC is therefore
modest, and the high costs of the measure are mainly justi¯ed in view of its redistribution e®ects.30
Bargain (2004a) evaluates the impact of the 2003 French PPE and alternative bene¯ts on the
employment incentives of women living in de facto couples and predict relatively small employment
e®ects (+0.4%). The reform is indeed marginal, but it has signi¯cant e®ects: most importantly
the increase in participation does not bring about a decrease in hours worked by the population
already in employment (although a negligible number of females - about 4,000 - may be pushed
towards inactivity given that the spouse now has higher net earnings). The limited counter e®ects
in the PPE reform are due to the double targeting of the instrument: while the household income
requirement is fairly large, the wage requirement targets workers with wages around the minimum
wage. Moreover the scaling of the bene¯t according to working time, increases the bene¯t for
employees working full time. The 2003 reform partially goes in the wrong direction, as it introduces
a part time premium that was intentionally avoided in the ¯rst reform, however the size of the
premium is evidently not high enough to drive a reduction in working hours as in the case of the
30 Contrary to other studies, the results for the WFTC are presented in table 8 both for couples and for singles
women in order to emphasize the di®erent incentive e®ects of a measure targeting households.
14Minijob and the WFTC.
The increase in hours worked is highest in Italy, although the impact on participation is neg-
ative. The second greatest e®ect in terms of hours comes from the Dutch reform. This is not
surprising as the Dutch labor market is characterized by signi¯cant dispersion in work hours and
one of the main characteristics of the reform is to increase incentives to work full-time for secondary
earners (Van Soest and Das, 2000). The largest increase in employment is brought about by the
British WFTC, but only for the sub population of lone mothers. This is indeed a particularly
vulnerable subpopulation in the UK, but less so in continental countries. Overall, however, the
negative employment e®ect of mothers in couples tend to reduce the positive employment e®ect.
In the case of Belgium, few studies have addressed the potential e®ects of the recent reforms.
Vallenduc (2002) analyzes the 2001 tax reform in purely static terms and focuses on the change
in marginal and e®ective tax rates as well as changes in replacement rates, concluding that the
reform is likely to have a positive impact on labor supply (although the increase in replacement
rates is not concentrated where poverty traps are most signi¯cant). Saintrain (2002), on the
other hand, uses a macro model to estimate the impact of the 2001 tax reduction. The model
he uses is almost totally demand-driven (although the author concedes that the tax reform could
bring about a slight increase in labor supply, and thus a decrease in the NAIRU. 31 The author
argues that the reform could bring about a partial decrease in the wage wedge, thus increasing
the demand for labor.32 According to estimates using the macro model of the Federal Planning
Bureau (HERMES), potential additional employment could be at around 25,000 units.
Vermeulen (2006) analyzes the impact of the 2001 tax reform. His study, although micro-based,
adopts a totally di®erent framework: household members are not assumed to behave a single utility
maximizing agent, but rather as a couples of individuals interacting in a collective setting. The
author predicts that the reform will have only a marginal e®ect, but he limits the analysis on
the very small sample of households without children. Following Bargain (2004a), Orsini (2005)
estimates a model for females in couples only, assuming a ¯xed labor supply of the male spouses.
According to this study, the labor supply of females could increase by over 20,000 units after the
tax reform.
We are not aware of any micro-based assessment of potential labor supply e®ects of the most
recent reform.
6 Evaluation of the reforms in Belgium
Table 9 shows the predicted e®ect of the reforms carried out in Belgium on the labor supply of
couples. Net increases labor supply is expressed both in terms of additional individuals entering
the labor market and in terms of additional full time equivalent positions. Following reform I,
labor supply is estimated to increase by around 26,000 FTE units (11,000 additional females and
31 Non-accelerating in°ation rate of unemployment.
32 Note that this approach is totally di®erent from our framework. After estimating a labor supply model (infra),
we estimate the impact of the ¯scal shock, assuming that all the decrease in income tax will correspond to an increase
in the net wage that leaves the gross wage una®ected
1515,000 additional males). The predicted response is much lower than the estimates of Orsini
(2005), probably due to the fact that the current framework allows for a simultaneous behavioral
adjustments of both partners.
When looking at the disaggregated e®ects, the CIBRAP has indeed a positive participation
e®ect, but the latter is partially outweighed by the negative impact on hours of those males and
especially females who are already in employment. For at least some of them, the CIBRAP entails
an incentive to shorten working times. Indeed while almost 3,000 females would be encouraged
to take up a job, almost 1,500 FTE positions are destroyed by the reduction in working time of
females already in employment. The scenario is similar in the case of males, where the additional
2,000 new entrants are partially o®set by a reduction of 1,000 FTE units.
In the second version of the reform, this does not happen. The reduction in working time of
those already in employment is zero for females, and only slightly higher for males.33 The incentive
to take up work, on the other hand, is much stronger: almost 7,000 units are likely to take up work
following the reform of the EB. The di®erence is especially strong for males. This is not surprising:
for workers with a productivity level above the minimum wage the CIBRAP is only interesting
when working part-time. With the EB, however, disposable income also increases when working
part-time.
The other instruments have a similar impact in both reforms. The broadening of the central
tax bracket and the alignment of the tax exempt income quota on the level of single households
both have a considerable impact. The latter is especially strong in the case of males (+6,000 FTE
units).
The abolition of the highest marginal tax rate, on the other hand, has the smallest participation
e®ect. The latter was indeed expected as those who are most likely to bene¯t from this reform are
indeed likely to already be economically active. What is quite striking, however, is the negative
e®ect on hours worked of those who are already in employment. Indeed labor supply elasticities
tend to decrease as income increases, and for some households in higher income deciles the income
e®ects outweighs the substitution e®ect, giving rise to negative labor supply elasticities.
Considering all the interactions between the di®erent instruments, the combination of the EB
and the tax reform (net of the CIBRAP for employees) has a stronger incentive e®ect than the
reform of the personal income tax alone. In the second scenario the labor supply e®ect is about
11,000 units FTE higher than in the ¯rst scenario (more or less equally split between males and
females).
In relative terms the employment rate of females and males is increased by +.76 and +.95
percentage points following reform II, while the increase in hours worked is in the order of +1.44%
and +1.20% for females and males respectively (between a third and a half of the increase is due
to the BE alone). Note that in the case of reform I the increase in employment rate would have
been in the order of +.7 percentage points for both males and females, whereas the increase in
hours worked would have been in the order of +0.87%.
33 Note there is a higher share of males working over time and that the BE is computed in terms of equivalent full
time income, so that the BE does not entail an incentive to work over time.
167 Conclusion
This paper reviews tax and bene¯t reforms recently implemented in several EU countries from the
point of view of their impact on labor supply, both at the intensive and the extensive margins.
Most recent ex-ante evaluation literature is based on microsimulation and discrete modeling
of labor supply. In the paper we develop a similar model for Belgium. This allows us to estimate
the e®ects of two recent Belgian reforms in a way that is consistent with most of recent ex-ante
evaluation literature. Yet a cross country comparison of the e®ects of the reforms is a potentially
dangerous exercise, given that the reforms have di®erent costs. Table 10 compares the cost of
the reforms considered. All estimates are based on static microsimulation. Such simulations, also
known as `day-after' simulations, do not take into account feedback e®ect from changes in agents'
behavior.
The aggregate cost of the Belgian reforms is slightly lower than the German and Dutch reforms
(1.25% against 1.65% and 1.55% of GDP, respectively). Lower and upper bound estimates in the
case of Italy depend on the extension of the NTA. In the lower boundary case (where the NTA is
set to zero), the reform is comparable in terms of budgetary e®orts, to those of the Netherlands
and Germany. The presence of the NTA, however, considerably expands the cost of the reform.
When it comes to MWP instruments, the British WFTC clearly stands out as the most expen-
sive measure (.54% of GDP). Note that this ¯gure does not correspond to the cost of the WFTC,
but to the cost of the switch from the FC to the WFTC. The total budgetary cost of the reform is
therefore much larger. On the other extreme, the German Minijob may be de¯nitely characterized
as a marginal measure: it was predicted to absorb only about .05% of the GDP. Indeed, as shown
in the budget lines, the reform only targets workers in very marginal part time. The French PPE
is also relatively marginal (.14% of GDP). Its budgetary cost is almost a quarter of that of the
WFTC. The Belgian CIBRAP costs slightly more than the PPE (.17% of GDP), whereas the EB
is slightly more expensive (.22% of GDP). Note however that reform I and reform II are broadly
comparable in terms of budgetary cost: lower social security contributions in fact are compensated
by an increase in gross taxable income.
Although not available in all cases surveyed, the budgetary cost per job created (or rather
per job taken up) is an interesting statistics to look at. In terms of FTE position taken up, the
estimated budgetary cost is in the the order of 200,000 EUR for the WFTC, 170,000 EUR for the
German tax reform and 120,000 EUR for the French PPE. In the case of Belgium the cost for job
taken up varied from 150,000 EUR in reform I to 100,000 EUR in reform II. Clearly, the low labor
supply elasticities, imply enormous cost per job taken up.34
It should however be stressed that the above ¯gures should be interpreted cautiously given the
di®erence in sampling and weighting procedures as well as in initial conditions - i.e. employment
34 These ¯gures may be easily compared with other studies. The IFS estimates that the WFTC has an average
cost per job created in the order of 300,000 EUR. Bargain and Orsini (2006) simulate the introduction of a low
wage subsidy similar to the French PPE (but without any household related supplements) for France, Germany and
Finland. The estimated cost for job taken up varies from 65,000 EUR (France) to 166,000 EUR (Finland). These
¯gures would be even higher if the cost would be expressed in terms of FTE positions.
17rates, distribution of working time and structure of preferences. Moreover a classi¯cation of the
reforms on the basis of the sole criterion of their potential impact on the labor supply would be
unfair. Equity considerations might indeed reverse the judgements on the relative e±ciency of the
di®erent measures.
It seems therefore more appropriate to draw some very general conclusions from the multiple
experiences taken in consideration and, possibly, to derive some policy guidelines for future tax
and bene¯t reform.
As shown in the German case, focusing on personal income tax alone might not be very
e®ective in increasing labor supply amongst the low skilled population. While income tax might be
particularly low for workers with weak earning capacity, SSCs are mostly not progressive, and tend
to signi¯cantly reduce decrease the ¯nancial gains to take up work in the low skilled population.
The Minijob reform was partially an attempt to target the low skilled population by reducing the
social security contributions on the low earnings.
Similarly, the WFTC scheme increases the disposable income of poor working households. The
scheme, however, is based on a household level means-test. Secondary earners therefore tend to
reduce labor supply in order to enter the eligibility range. In the case of singles, this e®ect is not
encountered, given that eligibility is conditional on working at least 16 hours and that there is a
premium for working more than 30 hours.
In the case of Germany, the eligibility to the SSCs subsidy is assessed at personal level, but
there is no working time requirement. This imply that medium and highly skilled workers could
reduce their working time to marginal working part time in order to bene¯t from the subsidy. In
the case of males the reform is therefore predicted to have a negative impact on working hours.
An hours requirement, like in the case of the WFTC, would have partially reduced the negative
impact of the reform on working hours.
This point is particularly evident in comparing the two subsidies introduced in Belgium in 2001
and in 2004. The positive employment e®ect of the CIBRAP, is indeed strongly reduced by the
negative e®ect of the population already at work. However the BE avoids this negative outcome
by tying the size of the subsidy to equivalent full time earnings and to hours worked. The same
structure was partially present in the French PPE, but was partially modi¯ed by subsequent policy
change.
That joint assessment of household income (both for tax and subsidy purposes) might have
potentially perverse e®ects is also evident from the Dutch experience. Until before the reform
spouses were allowed to transfer personal earnings tax allowances above a determined minimum
level. This pushed several secondary earners -mostly women- to work very marginal part time, in
order to maximize the transferable part of the personal allowance.35 Indeed one peculiar aspect of
the evaluation of the Dutch reform is the increase in the working hours of females, which is only
partially driven by a change in participation.
35 Steiner and Wrohlich (2004) provide further evidence of the negative e®ects of joint income taxation on the labor
supply of females. The authors - who use again the discrete choice setting - show that the individualization of the
tax system might have substantial incentive e®ects on the labor supply of secondary earners.
18The reduction of highest marginal tax rates, on the other hand, tend to have a negligible impact
on labor supply. This is witnessed by both the Dutch, the Italian and the Belgian evaluations.
In the case of the Netherlands the increase in hours worked (for males) is particularly small. The
same applies to the °at tax rate reform in Italy: participation is unchanged while there is only
a small increase in working hours. In the case of females the °at tax rate pushes some workers
out of the labor market, while average working hours on average increase. The latter depends
on the distribution of labor supply elasticity in the working population. Indeed while low income
households tend to be extremely reactive in changes to the tax system, higher income household
tend to be on average less reactive, due to the interaction between substitution and income e®ect.
This is particularly clear by looking at Belgium, where the increase in hours worked coming from
new entrants is almost totally outweighed by a reduction in the working e®ort of the population
in employment.
To sum up, the above survey points at the following evidence:
1. generalized tax cuts may not be the most e®ective way to stimulate labor supply; in particular
cutting the highest marginal rates has ambiguous e®ects on the supply on hours worked;
2. given the progressivity of most tax systems, rebates on SSCs tend to be more e®ective than
tax cuts in promoting the labor market participation of the low skilled population;
3. joint assessment of income for both purposes of taxation and bene¯t eligibility has unam-
biguous negative e®ects on the labor supply of secondary earners (i.e. mostly women);
4. MWP policies can be very e®ective in promoting the labor supply of the low skilled;
5. the design of MWP policies is of crucial importance: only instruments that correctly distin-
guish between low e®ort and low productivity may successfully counter the potential negative
impact on the hours worked of the population already in employment.
19Tab. 1: Descriptive statistics, population in working age1
Females Males
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Demographical variables
Age 40.901 12.497 40.799 12.557
Married 0.696 0.460 0.695 0.461
Children <3 0.082 0.274 0.078 0.269
Children >3 and <6 0.111 0.314 0.103 0.305
Educational variables
Primary education 0.181 0.385 0.216 0.412
Secondary education 0.361 0.480 0.346 0.476
Tertiary education 0.262 0.440 0.230 0.421
Master or Ph.D. 0.100 0.300 0.115 0.319
Labour market status
Retired 0.063 0.242 0.063 0.244
Disabled 0.037 0.190 0.035 0.183
On maternity leave 0.014 0.116 - -
Student 0.084 0.277 0.087 0.282
Self employed 0.039 0.194 0.064 0.244
Employee 0.539 0.499 0.648 0.478
Unemployed 0.081 0.272 0.051 0.220
Inactive 0.185 0.389 0.084 0.277
Hours worked and wages
Hours worked 17.243 18.020 26.164 20.926
Conditional hours worked 232.871 10.263 41.237 8.279
Hourly wage 2 6.239 0.182 6.374 0.234
Predicted hourly wage 3 6.170 0.196 6.261 0.299
Observations (unweighted) 2,271 2,194
Observations (weighted) 3,466,225 3,025,657
1 All females and males aged between 18 and 65.
2 Conditional on being in employment.
3 Conditional on being either unemployed or inactive.
20Tab. 2: Wage equation for females (with Heckman correction) and
males1
Females Males
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Hourly wage rate (ln)
Primary educ. 0.1934 0.0697 0.2465 0.0475
Secondary educ. 0.4306 0.0698 0.4331 0.0475
Tertiary educ. 0.6498 0.0728 0.6595 0.0486
Master or Ph.D. 0.8382 0.0782 0.8915 0.0530
Potential exp.2 0.2382 0.0520 0.1485 0.0325
Potential exp. sq. -0.0348 0.0149 -0.0015 0.0078
Constant 5.3810 0.0890 5.5857 0.0526
Employment (1=in employment)
Partner is emploed 0.4803 0.0814
nb. children <6 -0.2623 0.1004
Age 1.2263 0.2584
Age sq. -0.1761 0.0309
Primary educ. 0.4118 0.1474
Secondary educ. 0.7453 0.1356
Tertiary educ. or more 1.2719 0.1397








Wald test: joint signi¯cance (Chi2,5) 238.47 -
Wald test: joint signi¯cance (F,6,1384) - 90.7
Wald test: independent eqns (Chi2,1) 3.99 -
RMSE3 0.400 0.366
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1%-level, italic letters refer to the 5%-level and
underlined letters to the 10%-level.
1 Females and males aged between 18 and 65 either employed, unemployed or inactive.
2 Potential experience is de¯ned as current age net of years of schooling and the age when
schooling starts(6).
3 Root of mean squared prediction errors.




Age female 40.613 9.164
Age female sq. 17.333 7.629
Age male 42.531 9.078
Age male sq. 18.912 7.858
Children <6 0.381 0.685













Number of households (unweighted) 1,152
Number of households (weighted) 1,951,289
1 Couples where both members are either employed, inactive or unem-
ployed.
2 Net household monthly income (EUR). Hf and Hm refer to hours
worked by female and male respectively.
22Tab. 4: Conditional Logit: Preference Structure
Coef. Std. Err.
®c Age female -0.1230 0.0665
Age female sq. 0.1380 0.0756
Age male -0.0113 0.0702
Age male sq. 0.0307 0.0776
Constant 3.2636 1.4393
®cc -0.0199 0.0051
®hf Age female -0.0036 0.0021
Age female sq. 0.0064 0.0026
Children < 6 0.0064 0.0027
Constant 0.4310 0.0547
®hhf -0.0033 0.0003
®hm Age male -0.0068 0.0025










Number of obs. 1151
Log-likelihood -2439.42
Wald test: joint signi¯cance (Chi2,4) 8.08
Bold letters indicate signi¯cance at the 1%-level, italic letters refer to
the 5%-level and underlined letters to the 10%-level.
23Tab. 5: Observed and predicted frequencies
Weekly working hours Observed Predicted
Females Males frequencies frequencies1
0 0 9.9 9.01
0 40 19.55 21.44
0 50 9.9 8.91
20 0 2.35 3.50
20 40 15.38 13.93
20 50 5.99 6.29
40 0 3.13 3.31
40 40 19.64 18.69
40 50 8.43 9.18
50 0 0.96 0.51
50 40 2.95 3.45
50 50 1.82 1.77
1 Predicted frequencies are computed by averaging up over
the whole sample, each household's probability to chose a
given regime.
Tab. 6: Labor supply elasticities
Females Males
Hours Part. Hours Part.
Own wage elasticity 0.1967 0.1271 0.1753 0.163
(.1799 , .2688) (.1208 , .1829) (.1535 , .1979) (.1456 , .1896)
Cross wage elasticity -0.0327 -0.0239 0.0162 0.0159
(-.07377 , -.0571) (-0.0459 , 0.0381) (-.0011 , .0028) (.0019 , .0066)
Elasticities have been computed numerically by increasing by 1% the gross wage of males and females and recom-
puting optimal labour supply. Labour supply responses are averaged up over the whole sample. The ¯gures in
brackets give the bootstrapped 95% con¯dence interval obtained by drawing 100 independent draws of the parame-
ters from the estimated asymptotic distribution of their estimator, calibrating and computing elasticities for each































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































27Tab. 10: Budget Cost of Recent Tax and Bene¯t Reforms
Euro milions % of 2001 GDP Source
Tax reductions
Netherlands 7,000 1.648 Ministerie van FinanciÄ en (2000)
Germany 32,000 1.551 Bundes¯nanzministerium (2003)
Italy (lower boundary) 20,000 1.644 Baldini and Bosi (2002)
(upper boundary) 45,000 3.699 Baldini and Bosi (2002)
Belgium (net of CIBRAP) 2,992 1.166 Own estimates
(net of EB) 2,819 1.099 Own estimates
Making Work Pay
Germany MINI-JOB 1,000 0.048 Steiner and Whrohlich (2004)
France PPE 2,102 0.144 Legendre et al. (2002)
UK WFTC 8,465 0.532 Inland Revenue (2001)
Belgium CIBRAP 446 0.174 Own estimates
EB 599 0.233 Own estimates
Own estimates are based on Mod¶ et¶ e.
28Fig. 1: Pre and post reform budget lines for a single earner household1
1 Remark: Households with two dependent children (aged 4 and 6), one adult working 0 to 80 at a
wage rate of 6.6 EUR/hour.
Reform I and Reform II apply to the case of Belgium alone.
29Fig. 2: Pre and post reform budget lines for a two earner household1
1 Remark: Households with two dependent children (aged 4 and 6), one partner working 40 hours,
the other partner working 0 to 80 both at a wage rate of 6.6 EUR/hour.
Reform I and Reform II apply to the case of Belgium alone.
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